Abstract Subtyping in first order object calculi is studied with respect to the logical semantics obtained by identifying terms that satisfy the same set of predicates, as formalised through an assignment system. It is shown that equality in the full first order ς-calculus is modelled by this notion, which in turn is included in a Morrisstyle contextual equivalence.
Introduction
Subtyping is a prominent feature of the type-theoretic foundation of object oriented programming languages. The basic idea is expressed by subsumption: any piece of code of type A can masquerade as code of type B whenever A is a subtype of B, written A <: B.
In typed calculi, equations can be expressed between terms of the same type; since terms may have several types because of subsumption, it is commonly postulated that if a = b : A (a and b are equal at type A) and A <: B then a = b : B (but not viceversa): call this equational subsumption. In the realm of object calculi, object types are essentially interfaces, and subtyping interface restriction. Therefore subsumption is justified by the intuition that any object which is able to react to messages mentioned in A a fortiori will answer correctly to messages in the smaller interfaces represented by its supertypes. Similarly, equational subsumption is understood on the ground of context separability: a and b are contextually equivalent at type A if both are typeable by A and no context with a hole of type A can separate them. This provides an interpretation of subtyping: A <: B should hold if any pair of terms contextually equivalent at type A cannot be separated at B. This is semantically understood in two ways, according to the existing literature: either by means of coercions, or by inclusion of partial equivalence relations (see [16] Chap. 10 for a gentle introduction to these approaches, where coercions are called "conversion functions", and PER semantics "subset interpretation of types").
According to coercion semantics introduced in [8] , the relation A <: B is witnessed by the existence of a definable function from A to B, coercing values of one type into the other. Given that, each term and its type is translated into a term typeable in a system without subtyping at all. Since such a translation depends on the typing derivation of the original term, a coherence theorem is needed to prove that different typing derivations yield equivalent translations. Object and recursive types are not the concern of [8] ; unfortunately when dealing with such form of polymorphic types the coercion approach has some serious disadvantages. Indeed there is no clear interpretation for object-types coercions: these cannot be reduced to function and (recursive) record types, for which coercion semantics can be easily defined, because of the self-reference which is an essential feature of objects. Furthermore it is a term-model semantics, where term complexity grows because of the translation step. Last but not least, coercion semantics does not reflect the actual implementation practice of object-oriented languages, where subtyping is just type casting which does not affect the object code.
PER semantics interprets types as binary relations over a structure of untyped realisers, and terms as (equivalence classes of) realisers. In [9] subtyping was interpreted as relation inclusion for the first time. To interpret object and recursive types, however, one needs to ensure the existence of certain fixed points of type functors, which is a quite difficult task, as the relevant functors are not necessarily continuous, not even monotonic. The problem has been confronted by means of metrics and Banach fixed-point theorem (see [3, 6, 10, 11] ), and by restricting to the category of complete uniform PERs over a realizability structure which is an inverse limit. Based on these, in [1] Chap. 14 a CUPER semantics of the ς -calculus is proposed, and the soundness of the whole system studied in the book is established. Unfortunately the adopted solution for modelling object types as (continuous) unions of fixed points of type functors is not very natural and quite complex in nature. Hence the remark that "there are obvious difficulties to extract from the (PER) models and justify a finitary programming logic" of [6] applies a fortiori to the case of object-calculi, where the call for such a logic is compelling.
We propose a third approach which, in our view, can lead to a simpler logical framework for reasoning about object oriented programs. It is based on the ideas of logical semantics and domain logic [4] . In the latter perspective, the meaning of a term is determined by the set of the predicates it satisfies, so that two terms are equivalent if they are interpreted by the same set. To account for equivalence "at" a certain type A we relativize this form of absolute indiscernibility to sets of predicates indexed over types, calling them languages. Hence a and b are logically equivalent at type A if they satisfy the same set of predicates from the language L A associated to A.
We treat three kinds of entities, namely terms, types and predicates, and define a formal system to derive judgements of the shape a:A:σ . The system is built in such a way that, if we forget about any one of these three kinds of entities, what remains is still a meaningful assignment system. Indeed, if we forget about predicates we obtain the first order object calculus called FOb 1<:μ in [1] , but for a minor difference (we do not use fold, unfold operators in the term syntax, and consider as isomorphic all the unfoldings of a recursive type).
If instead we erase all types, we get a sort of "intersection type" assignment system for the untyped ς -calculus (essentially that one used in [12] to characterise the convergence of untyped ς -terms). The predicates system has features different from the type system: objects are treated as records, deducing a predicate :σ → φ about a single method labelled by , that can be put in conjunction with any other similar predicate, possibly with a different premise of the arrow. This works because the meaning of a: :σ → φ is not that the self variable has type σ ; rather it claims that σ is a precondition of the method , which yields a value a. satisfying the postcondition φ if σ holds for a. Therefore to conclude that a. :φ one needs to show that both a: :σ → φ and a:σ for some σ .
Semantically speaking, this is Kamin's self-application interpretation of objects, accounting for the interpretation of self reference in case of method call and of method overriding. Eventually, this produces the effect that converging terms are characterised by predicates, whereas types that ensure, for example, error freeness (no "message not understood" error can occur with typed terms at run time), cannot discriminate diverging terms. We claim that the resulting system is a kind of extended Curry-style assignment system, determining a model for the ς -calculus, which is an extension of the filter model for the pure Lambda Calculus of [7] . This depends on the fact that a notion of implication is defined over predicates which is written σ ≤ τ . This way we build a logic whose filters of formulae provide a denotation to terms, coinciding with the sets of their properties as expressed by the logical formulae (see [4] , where this is framed as a form of Stone duality between categories of semi-lattices and of Scott domains).
The third possibility is to forget about terms; then we interpret the judgement A:σ as: "the predicate σ makes sense of terms of type A", namely σ ∈ L A for closed A. This logic of types, again inspired to domain logic, is our tool to treat object and recursive types. The formal system formalises the concept that both object and recursive types are some kind of fixed point, which is constructed starting with the trivial predicate ω, and iterating the proper rules determined by the structure of type expressions. We observe that this definition of the languages of object and recursive types is inductive, and that it makes sense without any consideration about the invariance of the object types nor (and more importantly) about the variance of the occurrences in A of the type variable X within the recursive type μX.A.
The importance of the interplay between these assignment systems (actually integrated in a unique system) emerges when treating program equivalence. The system induces an equivalence relation a b : A, which, when restricted to closed terms and types, expresses: the sets of predicates of type A that can be assigned to a and to b coincide. Observing that the derivability of a:A : σ always implies that σ ∈ L A , this formalises the above idea of relativizing logical semantics to types.
To verify that this is a sound theory of the first order object calculus, we prove that T a ↔ b : A (the equational theory of FOb 1<:μ ) implies that a b : A, which in turn implies that a Q A b, namely that a and b cannot be separated by any context _ : A C[_ ] : K of any ground type K. This Morris-style contextual equivalence is called the observational equivalence in [14] and is a maximal consistent theory of the first order object calculus.
To establish the latter results we have to relate our theory of predicates assignment to terms and types to the theory of subtyping. First we establish that if A <: B then L A ⊇ L B : hence the logical theory associated to A is finer than the theory of B, so that any pair of terms which are indiscernible according to A, are such in the coarser theory of B but not vice-versa. This is indeed our interpretation of subtyping and equational subsumption.
To prove the inclusion of the logical equivalence in the observational equivalence we use a realizability interpretation of predicates instead of types. This is not surprising since the key property of convergence is not captured by the type system, but only by the predicate system, as remarked above. We think that the logical equivalence is the theory of a model of the typed calculus, which can be constructed as a filter model. We do not enter into the details of this construction in the present paper, and shortly comment on it in Sect. 8.
Overview of Contents
The paper is organised as follows: in Sect. 2 we introduce our variant of the FOb 1<:μ system. We define predicates, their logic and assignment to types in Sect. 3. The assignment system, which essentially puts together the typing system with the logic of predicates is defined and studied in Sect. 4. Basic soundness results of the assignment system with respect to the operational semantics are established via subject reduction and (typed) subject expansion in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6 we recall the equational theory of FOb 1<:μ from [1] ; we then formally define the logical equivalence and show that the former is included in the latter. Finally, in Sect. 7, we define the observational semantics after [14] and prove the inclusion of the logical semantics in it. We eventually discuss the results presented in the paper, and relate our work to the literature on the subject in Sect. 8.
The First Order Object Calculus
We consider a first order object calculus which is a variant of the calculus called FOb 1<:μ in [1] . The difference between that version and the one we treat here is that we consider recursive types and their unfoldings as equivalent with respect to subtyping. Consequently, we do not have any syntax to distinguish among the folded and unfolded version of the same term fold(A, a) and unfold(a), which will be written simply a. Indeed semantically they are all equivalent expressions in [1] , where fold and unfold do not affect the computational behaviour of terms and are used just to ensure the existence of a minimal type of any given term: a useful property for type reconstruction algorithms which is not the present concern, however.
For the sake of readability the calculus is introduced in two steps: we first define pre-types A, pre-terms a and pre-environments E by means of grammars. These are not necessarily well-formed types, terms and environments, as the latter notions are defined via derivation systems. We will in fact present a number of type assignment systems that are interdependent each other, whose statements (judgements and sequents) have the intended meaning:
E is a well formed environment (an environment for short); E T A Ais a type within the environment E; E T A <: B A is a subtype of B within the environment E; E O a : A a is a term of type A in the environment E.
Definition 2.1 (PRE-TYPES, PRE-TERMS, PRE-ENVIRONMENTS)
Let K be a countable set of type constants ranged over by K, and X a denumerable set of type variables ranged over by X. Let L = { i | i ∈ N} be a denumerable set of labels; let C a countable set of term constants ranged over by c and V a denumerable set of term variables ranged over by x. The syntax of pre-types, pre-terms and pre-environments is defined by the following grammar:
Pre-Types: A, B ::
where I ranges over finite subsets of N, and i , ∈ L.
The notion of free and bound occurrences of variables, as well as substitution, are defined as usual.
Definition 2.2 (FREE AND BOUND, SUBSTITUTION)
We say that X is free in A if it does not occur within the scope of μX; it is bound otherwise. Similarly, x is free in a if it does not occur within the scope of some λx A nor of some ς(x A ); it is bound otherwise. We use fv(A) and fv(a) to denote the sets of free variables occurring in A and a respectively; bv(A) and bv(a) denote the sets of the bound variables.
By A{X ← B} and a{x ← b} we denote the substitution of X and x by B and b in A and a respectively, up to renaming of bound variables to avoid variable clashes.
Syntactic equality, up to the renaming of bound variables, is denoted by ≡. Term-operational semantics does not depend on types, and can be defined directly over pre-terms.
Definition 2.4 (REDUCTION)
(i) Evaluating contexts are term expressions with a hole [_], and are generated by the grammar:
We will write E[a] for filling the hole [_] in E with a. (ii) The one-step reduction relation on terms is the binary relation defined by the following rules:
where in the first two rules j ∈ I is required. (iii) The relation * −→ is the reflexive and transitive closure of →.
The reduction relation is essentially the same in [14] . It is trivially confluent. Even relaxing Definition 2.4 and taking the closure of → under arbitrary contexts would not destroy confluence, as can be shown e.g. by adapting the Martin-Löf technique for proving the Church-Rosser theorem for the λ-calculus. As for typed λ-calculi with recursion (e.g. PCF), typed terms do not necessarily have a normal form: as we shall In [1] , Chap. 6 the operational semantics of the object calculi is defined by means of a big-step predicate a v, where a is a closed term, and v is a value. Values are defined as follows: Definition 2.5 (VALUES) A value is a closed pre-term belonging to the set defined by the grammar:
It is easy to see that a v if and only if a * −→ v. The reduction relation is more general since it is defined for any term (possibly with free variable occurrences). It is even true that normal forms are not necessarily values, but if a is typeable (i.e. a term), having a normal form b, then b is value, as follows by Theorem 2.17 below and the fact that closed normal forms which are not values are not typeable.
We just stress that, consistent with the definition of in [1] , in the clause:
a renaming of the self type of the bound variable x A into x A j occurs. This is immaterial in the fragments of the ς -calculus without subtyping, but it is needed in the presence of type subsumption since if A = [ i :B i i∈I ], and A<:C, then we can give type C to any term of type A and therefore update a method in an object of type A with ς(x C )b; but the result of (naively) performing the update saving the self type C is no longer typeable, as the selves of the methods now have different types (see below rule (Val Object) for object typing).
The simply typed λ-calculus is a sub-calculus of the Object Calculus: since the only evaluation contexts dealing with abstraction and application have the shape E[_ ](a), it is a lazy λ-calculus, in the sense of [5] . Also objects are "lazy", in the sense that the bodies of the methods are not reducible before selection.
We adopt the alternative notation a ⇓ v for a v, as it is commonly used in the literature of λ-calculus and related systems. The notions of inference rule and derivation are as usual. As in [1] , we will use a short-hand for rules, and write for example (where I = {1, . . . , n})
Definition 2.8 (PRE-ENVIRONMENT) A pre-environment E is defined via the grammar:
where X is a type variable, A a pre-type, x a term variable. The domain of a pre-environment E is the set of type and term variables occurring in E, and is defined by:
Although pre-environments are formally sequences, by abuse of notation we shall treat them as sets and write X ∈ E, X <: A ∈ E or x:A ∈ E to mean that X, X <: A and x:A occur as elements of the sequence E respectively. A type sequent has the form E J where E is a pre-environment and J is a type judgement.
Definition 2.10 (THE TYPED OBJECT CALCULUS)
A sequent E J is derivable in the calculus of objects if there exists a derivation whose inferences are instances of the rules in Figs. 1, 2 and 3, such that E J appears in the bottom line.
We say that E is an environment, A is a type in the environment E and a a term (of type A) in the environment E, if E T , E T A and E O a : A are derivable respectively.
We will write D :: E J when D is a derivation whose conclusion is the sequent E J , and will write E J if there exists a derivation D such that D :: E J , i.e. this sequent is derivable.
From now on, when dealing with environments, types and terms, we will assume they are well formed. The following lemmas state some basic properties of the system. We write E T A =: B to abbreviate E T A <: B and E T B <: A.
Lemma 2.12
Proof Immediate by inspection of rules. Observe that if
Lemma 2.13 (TYPE GENERATION LEMMA)
Proof Straightforward.
The following is easy to show: Lemma 2.14 (TYPED TERMS GENERATION LEMMA) 
Proof By induction on the structure of derivations.
The following property is standard, and allows to generalise derivable results.
Lemma 2.15 (WEAKENING)
Proof By induction on derivations. We just remark that, e.g. in case of (i), if E T A then E T by (i) of Lemma 2.13, so that E, X T because X ∈ dom(E) is the side condition of rule (Env X). It follows that the derivation of E, X T A is essentially the same as the given derivation of E T A, but for the sub-derivation of the sequent E, X T . In case of E, X <: C T A we need the hypothesis E T C because of the premise of rule (Env X<:). Note that X ∈ dom(E) and E T C imply X ∈ fv(C) by (iv) of Lemma 2.13. The proofs of the other items are similar.
Lemma 2.16 (SUBSTITUTION LEMMA FOR
Proof By induction on the structure of derivations using Lemma 2.14. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 5.2.
Using Lemma 2.16, we can prove the following theorem:
Proof By induction over the definition of → and using Lemma 2.14; the proof is similar to that of Theorem 5.3 but simpler.
Theorem 2.17 is the most relevant result about typed ς -calculus in [1] . It implies that no "message not understood" error can occur in the evaluation (formally in the reduction) of any well-typed term (a term in our terminology). In fact, for such an error to occur in the reduction of a it should be the case that a * ς(x A )d has no type, because of (v), (vi) and (vii) of Lemma 2.14, Theorem 2.17 says that a has no type as well.
Typed Predicates and Languages
In this section we will introduce the syntax of the predicates and an assignment system to syntactically derive judgements associating predicates to types under the assumption of similar judgements about a finite set of type variables.
Term properties are formalised by predicates, which in turn are classified by types. Predicates are transparently intersection types for a λ-calculus with records, and come from [12] . The essential difference is that the set of predicates is stratified into languages (see [13, 21] ), in such a way that whenever a predicate can be deduced for a (closed) term a, it belongs to the language L A associated with the (closed) type A.
Much in the style of [20] , in this section we will present a notion of strict intersection types, called strict predicates here. Using these, we will define in the next section a notion of predicate assignment, which will consists basically of associating a predicate to a typed term.
Definition 3.1 (PREDICATES)
The set P of predicates, ranged over by σ, τ, . . . and its subset P S of strict predicates ranged over by φ, ψ, . . . , are defined through the grammar:
where κ ranges over a countable set of atoms, and ∈ L is any (method) label.
Since ∧ is commutative and associative w.r.t. the equivalence introduced below in Definition 3.2, we omit brackets and write i∈I σ i for σ 1 ∧ · · · ∧σ n . Also, rather than (σ → φ)∧ :ψ are allowed by the above definition, although never derived for any type nor for any term by the assignment systems.
To build a logic of predicates we need a notion of implication, written σ ≤ τ (read as: "σ implies τ "), which is a reflexive and transitive relation on predicates, as defined below. Also, as in [20] , but differently w.r.t. [19] , we define ≤ to be contra-variant in arrow types.
Definition 3.2 (PREDICATE PRE-ORDER)
The relation ≤ over predicates is defined as the last pre-order such that for any σ, τ ∈ P and φ, ψ ∈ P S :
Finally σ = τ ⇐ ⇒ σ ≤ τ ≤ σ , and we write σ < τ if σ ≤ τ and σ = τ . A predicate is trivial if it is equivalent to ω.
The relation ≤ differs from that considered in [7] , in that there ω → ω = ω, whereas here we only allow ω → ω < ω. This is natural in the present context of lazy evaluation, where an abstraction should always have a conjunction of arrow predicates, hence different from ω, even if it does not return a result. Since strict intersection types are essentially representatives of equivalence classes of type in [7] , in [20] , ω → ω is not a type; any term typeable by that type in [7] is typeable only by ω in [20] .
Lemma 3.3
For any σ, τ ∈ P, and φ, ψ ∈ P S :
Proof To see (i) let σ ≤ σ and τ ≤ τ ; then by the definition of ∧ as the meet w.r.t. ≤ we have that σ ∧τ ≤ σ ≤ σ and σ ∧τ ≤ τ ≤ τ , which implies that σ ∧τ ≤ σ ∧τ . By inspection of the axioms of ≤ it is evident that if ω ≡ φ ∈ P S then φ = ω; hence (ii) follows by the fact that σ ≡ i∈I φ i for some φ i ∈ P S and that if either
The proof of (iii) is straightforward. About (iv) we note that i :φ i i∈I ≡ i∈I i :φ i , and that the meet operation ∧ is monotonic w.r.t. ≤ (part (i) of this lemma).
The first part of this lemma implies that to be a trivial predicate is decidable. The subsequent part says that ω → ω and :ω are the largest non trivial predicates among arrow and record predicates (with a certain label ) respectively. The last part claims that, with respect to ≤, record predicates mirror record subtyping in width and in depth. 
Proof By induction on the definition of ≤ (3.2). Note that the statements would become false with ≡ in place of = since equation σ ∧ω = σ trivially holds for any σ .
Definition 3.5 (PREDICATES CONTEXTS)
(i) Predicate pre-environments are defined by the following grammar:
where X is a type variable, σ is a predicate, and A is a pre-type. 
Set dom( ) = dom( ).
(iii) A predicate environment is a predicate pre-environment such that PT is derivable in the system of Fig. 4 , which we call the predicates to types assignment system. (iv) We extend the relation ≤ as defined on predicates to predicate environments by: ≤ if and only if, for every X:σ ∈ or X:σ <: A ∈ there exists X:σ ∈ or X:σ <: A ∈ respectively, such that σ ≤ σ . Definition 3.6 (ASSIGNMENT OF PREDICATES TO TYPES: LANGUAGES) Let be a predicate environment, A a type and σ a predicate. We write PT A:σ if this statement can be derived using the rules of Fig. 4 .
Given a closed type A we define the language of A as the set L A = {σ ∈ P | ∅ PT A:σ }.
Notice that, in the definition of the system as in Fig. 4 , σ, τ ∈ P while φ ∈ P S : otherwise one could assign to types predicates which are not in P at all. As stated in Definition 2.1, the basic type K in rule (Type Const) ranges over a countable set K of type constants: the assignment of the atoms κ to their types K is assumed to be fixed by a signature we do not make explicit.
Fig. 4 Predicates to types assignment system
As it is apparent from Definition 3.6, we are essentially interested in closed types and their languages. The reason why we introduce environments in the system is for a proper handling of assumptions of predicates assigned to type variables, which may occur in recursive types. This parallels the usage of environments E in the type system for T .
The logical interpretation of types we are proposing is as collections of predicates, closed under conjunction (by rule (∧)) and logical implication (by the admissibility of rule (≤) in Lemma 3.14): that is types are seen as propositional theories.
Since predicates are properties of terms, which in turn are polymorphic-typed entities, the soundness criterion we have in mind for the judgements A:σ is that there exists some term of type A satisfying σ : this is what we mean by saying that σ makes sense of entities of type A. We observe that this is the very departure of the present work from the endogenous logic of [4] : while there the logical interpretation of polymorphism is not considered (but for the limited case of recursive types), so that the logical and denotational interpretations of non isomorphic types are pairwise disjoint, the present construction allows for proper inclusions and non-empty intersections of languages. Once this is given we can derive more complex statements like:
where the derivation of PT A: 0 :ω → E is similar to that of PT A: 0 :ω → O .
The predicate 0 :ω → E, 1 : 0 :ω → O → O is satisfied by any object having at least methods labelled by 0 and 1 (that we identify with the respective methods), where 0 returns an even number, no matter which is the actual state of the object; 1 returns and odd integer provided that 0 does. This makes sense, however, and so it is not contradictory, since the second conjunct of the predicate is only a conditional. Moreover, this is essential for handling method overriding: see Example 5.4.
Concerning recursive types, consider the following derivation:
From this it is then not difficult to see that
We can naturally link derivations in PT to those in T via erasure of predicates.
Proof In both cases the proof is an easy induction on the structure of derivations. All cases are trivial, except for when the derivation ends by rule (∧) or (TypeRec); then the result follows by induction.
Proof Easy.
The next lemma states some standard properties of PT , that follow immediately from the rules in Fig. 4 . 
PT A:σ and X ∈ fv(A) then X:τ ∈ , for some τ ; The next lemma shows that, for object types A and C, if σ is a predicate that we can assign to A, which is a super-type of C, then also σ can also be assigned to C.
Lemma 3.12 Let
for some J ⊇ I and suppose Proof If σ = ω, the thesis is trivial by rule (ω). For σ = ω, we reason by induction over the structure derivations. Now, PT C <: A implies that both C and A are well formed types under .
By Lemma 3.10(e) we know that σ is (equivalent to) an intersection of record types of the shape i :τ → φ for some i ∈ I ⊆ J , and that both PT A:τ , for some τ , and PT B i :φ are derivable in sub-derivations. Therefore, by induction, we know that PT C:τ . Reconstructing the derivation as the one for PT A:σ , we obtain PT C:σ . Proof By induction on the structure of derivations. Since derivations in the Predicates to Types Assignment System mirror derivations in the type and subtype system of the object calculus in almost all cases, we focus on those rules which are not just a decoration of the type formation rules. Since no free type variable in B is declared in 1 , by Lemma 3.9 we obtain 0 , X:τ PT B:σ . Using the assumption 0 PT μX.B:τ , we get the desired 0 PT μX.B:σ by admissibility of rule (TypeRec ).
Lemma 3.14 The following rules are admissible:
(Relevance) :
Proof By easy induction on the structure of derivations. We will now show that PT is downwards closed for <:. 
The Assignment System
We now come to the definition of predicate assignment, where we associate predicates to typed terms. (ii) We extend ≤ to environments by: ≤ if and only if, for every x:A:σ ∈ there exists x:A:σ ∈ such that σ ≤ σ . (iii) A term pre-environment is a pair ; such that is a predicate preenvironment and is a basis. We also define dom( ; ) = dom( ) ∪ dom( ) and ; = ,ˆ (where the comma represents the concatenation of the two sequences).
Definition 4.2 (ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM)
An assignment judgement is a triple a:A:σ expressing the assignment of a predicate σ to the (pre) term a of (pre) type A. An assignment sequent has the shape ; T a:A:σ where ; is a term pre-environment.
The Assignment System to derive assignment sequents is defined in Fig. 5 . We say that a term pre-environment ; is a term environment if ; PT is derivable in the assignment system.
The judgement a:A:σ tells at the same time that a is of type A, and that it satisfies the predicate σ : hence this implies that A:σ (as this is witnessed by a), which is in fact ensured by the formal system. Since ω is the trivial predicate, the judgement a:A:ω is the same as a:A, i.e. a has type A. This is why we use O in the definition of P . However, we could avoid this explicit composition of systems, at the price of doubling all rules relating predicates to term and type structure, adding an instance of each such rule with all trivial predicates at the right end of the sequents. E.g. in the case of (Val Appl) we would have:
; This can be understood from the observation that the rule expresses that the newly derived predicate does not depend on any predicate for a at all; the only thing we need for subject reduction and expansion is that a is well-formed of type A.
On the other hand it is essential for Theorem 7.5 to hold, as well as for the subsequent results. These say that any (closed) term a satisfies a non-trivial predicate if and only if it is convergent, namely reduces to a value. Now the predicate j :τ → φ is non trivial, but a. j ς(y A )b converges only if a does. It is a remarkable fact that this is a combined effect of the type system and of the predicate system: indeed for a. j ς(y A )b to be convergent we also need that a reduces to an object term, having a label j . The type system ensures that if a converges, then this will be the case; the assumption that a:A:σ for σ = ω implies that a actually converges, even if σ is discarded in the conclusion. This will be formally proved in Sect. 7.
We are now in place to give a semantics to predicates. It consists in assigning to each predicate σ a set tσ u of closed terms of the appropriate (closed) types. It is usually called a realizability interpretation, in the sense that each term in tσ u is a realiser of σ , namely an evidence that σ holds of something. A proper reading of Theorem 7.5 is as a soundness theorem for the realizability interpretation. This interpretation should be compared with the interpretation of intersection types into saturated sets in [15] .
We write a A for a closed term a of a closed type A, i.e. such that ∅ O a:A (abbreviated by O a:A). In the next definition, the set of labels of A is defined as:
it is empty in all other cases. If a A for some object type A, j ∈ Label(A) and a
Definition 4.3 (REALIZABILITY INTERPRETATION)
The realizability interpretation of the predicate σ is a set tσ u of closed terms defined by induction over the structure of predicates as follows:
(v) t :φ u is defined according to the shapes of φ:
The clause t : :ψ u = ∅ is consistent with the fact that : :ψ cannot be assigned to any (well typed) term.
Lemma 4.4 If σ = ω (i.e. it is non trivial), then any a A ∈ tσ u converges.
Proof By induction on the definition of tσ u.
Lemma 4.5 If a A ∈ tσ u then for any
Proof By induction on the length of the reduction sequence, of which we only show the proof for the relation →. This is proven by induction on the definition of reduction and by cases on σ , of which we show one case:
(a ≡ (λx C a )a and σ ≡ τ → ψ) : then (λx C a )a ⇓ v for some v (an abstraction) with certain properties; but this is true if and only if b ≡ a {x ← a } ⇓ v, since the reduction is deterministic: hence b ∈ tτ → φu if and only if a ∈ tτ → φu.
Lemma 4.6 If σ ≤ τ then tσ u ⊆ tτ u.
Proof By easy induction on the definition of ≤ using Lemma 3.4. E.g. suppose :σ → φ ≤ :τ → ψ because τ ≤ σ and φ ≤ ψ. By Definition 4.3, for any a A ∈ t :σ → φ u we have a ⇓ and ∈ Label(A); suppose that c A ∈ tτ u: by induction c A ∈ tσ u, so that by hypothesis a. (c) ∈ tφu. The thesis follows since tφu ⊆ tψu again by induction.
We turn to the proof theoretic study of our systems, and formulate the link between PT and T , and P and O , which is a conservativity result. Proof By induction on the structure of derivations using Lemma 3.8.
The following lemma links P and PT . We will now show that also P is downwards closed for <:. 
Lemma 4.10 The following rule is admissible:
; , x:A:τ,
Proof Easy induction on the structure of derivations. Informally, each time there is an instance of the rule (Env x) with conclusion ; , x:A:τ, P x:A:τ in the derivation for ; , x:A:τ, P a:C:σ , we replace it by an instance of (<:) whose premises are ; , x:A :τ , P x:A:τ , T A <: A and O A:τ , where the conclusion is ; , x:A:τ , P x:A:τ .
The essential properties of the predicate assignment system, on which the subsequent treatment relies, are stated in next lemma. Proof By induction on the structure of derivations. We observe that in all clauses we use ≡ instead of =: (among types) and = (among predicates). This is possible since these are all existential statements of derivability, and do not necessarily refer to sub-derivations of the given one: hence we can choose types and predicates of the right form as we need. In particular in clause (c) we have φ ≡ k :τ → ψ instead of φ ≥ k :τ → ψ as one might expect. This is a consequence of the fact that languages are upward closed w.r.t. ≤ (by Lemma 3.14), and that E T A <: A for any A, so that if ; P a:A:σ and σ ≤ τ then ; P a:A:τ by (<:). Similar remarks apply to all other clauses.
Remark 4.12
The last lemma, together with Lemmas 2.14 and 3.10 forms the basic tool for reconstructing types and predicates in terms of the structure of the subject, namely the term. In particular Lemma 3.10 applies the same technique to the "subject" A in the judgement A:σ .
Their proofs are just backward readings of the derivation rules, and as such are very simple inductions over derivations which we omit.
All the implications in these lemmas are actually equivalences: indeed the opposite implications follow by direct application of (possibly more than one) derivation rules.
Although the relation ≤ is only used for variables, we can show the following lemma.
Lemma 4.13 The rule (≤) :
; P a:A:σ ;
is admissible.
Proof
(τ ∈ P S ) : By induction on the structure of the derivation for ; P a:A:σ .
(Val x) : Then a = x, σ ∈ P S , and there exists τ such that = of Lemma 3.4, for every j ∈ J there is an i ∈ I such that σ i ≤ τ j ∈ P S . The result follows by the first part of the proof, and applying rule (∧I).
Subject Reduction and Expansion
In this section we will show that predicate assignment as defined above is not only preserved by reduction, but also by expansion, i.e. if ; P a:A:σ and we can relate a to a via the reduction system, then also ; P a :A:σ . The following lemma concerns properties of the Object Calculus whose proofs are straightforward inductions over derivations. Proof Easy.
In the remaining part of this section we show that predicate assignment is closed for reduction and expansion. First we establish a substitution lemma. We use this lemma to show the following result. 
as the previous part. -There are τ, ψ, ρ = ω such that σ ≡ j :τ → ψ , and both (1) ;
i )b i (i∈I ) ]:C:ρ, and (2) ; , x j :C:τ P b j :C j :ψ. ; , x j :E:τ P b j :E j :ψ ; ,
and (<:), since E <: C <: A. -σ ≡ j :φ , for some j ∈ I , and we have both (1) 
and (<:), since E <: C <: A.
By induction on the structure of evaluating contexts.
For σ = ω, the result follows from Lemma 4.7, Theorem 2.17 and rule (ω). For σ = i∈I σ i , the result follows by the strict case, and rule (∧I). On the other hand, the following odd-looking assignment is legal as well:
In the last case, however, the apparently wrong predicate we deduce is of use to conclude as before:
which is what we expected.
We now come to the proof that predicate assignment is closed for subject expansion as well. With respect to the subject reduction property there is an asymmetry, since the expansion property does not hold, in general, in O . It might seem to be contradictory w.r.t. the conservativity established in Lemma 4.7, but it is not: remember that we assign predicates to typeable terms, while the property which we are going to establish concerns the predicates, and not the types. Therefore, we do not just assume that a → a, rather also that both have the same type A, and show that for any predicate σ such that a:A:σ can be derived in a suitable environment, also a :A:σ can be derived in the same environment. This could be called a typed subject expansion property.
We need the following lemma. Proof By induction on the length of the reduction sequence, of which we only show the base case, which is by definition on the reduction relation →. Most cases depend straightforwardly on Lemma 5.5; we show one case, that does not. First we deal with ; , x h :D:
from which, using rule (Val Update 1 ):
.
; , x k :D:
and the result follows by applying rule (<:).
For τ = ω, the result follows from Lemma 4.7, Theorem 2.17 and rule (ω). For τ = i∈I τ i (n ≥ 0), the proof follows by easy induction.
The Logical Equivalence
In [1] an equational theory of the object calculus is presented, whose first order subtheory is generated by the rules of Fig. 6 (omitting the term folding-unfolding rules, which do not make sense for the Object Calculus we consider here). Proof By induction over derivations. In rule (Eq Refl), which is the base case, the premise immediately implies the thesis. Cases of (Eq Symm) and (Eq Trans) are immediate consequences of the induction hypothesis. By rule (Eq α), we can assume that bound variables do not appear in the environment E, so that the choice of their names is arbitrary and does not conflict with the choice of free variable names.
In case of Eval rules use Theorem 2.17.
(Eq Subsumption) and (Eq Top) follow by the induction hypothesis and (Val Subsumption). For rule (Eq Sub Object) use Theorem 3.16 and the compatibility of P with respect to O , stated in Lemma 4.7.
All the Cong rules follow by induction.
Eventually, if E O a:
A then E T A by Lemma 2.14(i); this in turn implies E T by (i) of Lemma 2.13.
Remark 6.3
This notion of equality includes (typed) convertibility, as is clear from rules (Eval Beta), (Eq Select) and (Eq Update), but it does not coincide with it: in fact '↔' is a congruence whereas '→' is not closed under arbitrary contexts; more importantly, this is a consequence of subtyping and precisely of rule (Eq Sub Object) (see Example 6.5).
The assignment system of Definition 4.2 induces a logical notion of equivalence, according to which a and b are equal at A if they can be assigned the same set of predicates σ such that A:σ . More precisely, and taking into account environments and their extensions into bases, we can formalise this idea as follows: Definition 6.4 (LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE) Let a be any pre-term; we define P(E, a, A) as the set of predicates of type A that can be assigned to a when E O a:A:
We then say that the pre-terms a and b are logically equivalent at A and environment E if they can be assigned the same set of predicates of type A with respect to E: 
In [1] , Section 7.6.2 it is argued that they cannot be equated at A. Indeed, they are not logically equivalent at A since, if we assume that 1 is the predicate expressing the property of "being the number 1", so 1 ∈ L Int , and ; P 1:Int:1, then ; P b:A: 1 :ω → 1 but ; a:A: 1 :ω → 1 . Indeed (omitting again the 's and all those parts of the derivation justifying the assignment of the predicate to a type):
Replacing b by a would not yield a valid derivation. The best we can do in the case of a is instead:
To express this in natural language, what we have proven is that the value of b on calling method 1 is 1, and that this is a "field", in that it does not depend on other parts of b; on the other hand, for a the value returned by 1 We relate here logical equivalence to the equational theory of the Object Calculus.
Lemma 6.6 Logic equivalence is a congruence; more precisely:
Proof This is just a rephrasing of the substitution property stated in Lemma 5.2.
We want to establish that equality in the Object Calculus implies logical equivalence, proving that what we have seen in Example 6.5 actually holds in general. Corollary 3.17 is a first evidence of the consistency of the predicate assignment system with respect to the subtyping relation. It is however not enough.
Lemma 6.7 Let
A is the conclusion of rule (Eq Sub Object) under the premises 
. Suppose that σ ∈ P(E, a, A) and assume without loss of generality that σ ∈ P S \ {ω} (otherwise either it is ω, the trivial case, or it is a conjunction of predicates in P S and we reason similarly for each conjunct): hence σ ≡ i :τ → ψ for some i ∈ I and τ, ψ such that ; , Top) contain exactly all predicates equivalent to ω, so they coincide.
If the derivation ends by rule (Eq Sub Object), the thesis follows by Lemma 6.7. The case remains in which the derivation ends by rule (Eq Subsumption):
Let τ ∈ P(E, a, B): then ; P a:B:τ for some ; such that ; ≡ E. Since the premise E T a ↔ b:A implies that both E O a:A and E O b:A are derivable and E T A <: B implies that T A <: B, Lemma 4.8 applies, so that ; P a:A:τ is derivable, so τ ∈ P (E, a, A) . Also, by induction, P(E, a, A) = P (E, b, A) , that is ; P b:A:τ is derivable for certain ; such that ; ≡ E. Then ; 
Remark 6.9
The converse of Theorem 6.8 does not hold. To see a counter example consider: 0 ς(z A )y) . 0 Int → Int:φ, for some subtype A of A: since σ ∈ L A and O e:A we can freely assume that A is A, and that the last rule of this derivation is (Val Object). From the fact that φ ∈ L Int→Int we also know that, if it is not trivial, then it is an arrow, namely φ ≡ τ → κ for certain τ, κ ∈ L Int . Going backward in the derivation we arrive at x 1 :A:σ, y:Int:τ P (x 1 . 0 ς(z A )y). 0 :Int:κ which is the conclusion of (Val Select). By this we know that in the derivation we must have both We end this remark by observing that the logical complexity of the theory of logical equivalence is 0 2 , and we conjecture that it is a 0 2 -complete one, as it was the case for the theories of filter models of the untyped λ-calculus from which it derives. If this is the case there exists no formal system extending the theory of ↔ such that it coincides with .
Logical Equivalence and Observational Semantics
Observational semantics for the first order calculus has been defined in [14] in Morrisstyle, called there "contextual equivalence". It consists of inseparability by means of contexts of ground type. In the same paper it has been shown that this coincides with a notion of bisimulation which is stronger than '↔'. We will adopt a slightly more general definition here.
We claim that, when restricted to closed terms, logical equivalence is included in observational equivalence. To this aim we will establish a computational adequacy result for the logical semantics with respect to convergence, which states that any well-typed term can be assigned a non-trivial predicate if and only if it converges to a value. This is achieved by means of the realizability interpretation of predicates given in Definition 4.3, proving that the characterisation results of [12] are preserved in the typed context of the first order object calculus.
As also mentioned in the Introduction, we will write _: 
for any ground type K and value v of type K.
Remark 7.2
(i) Typeable values can always be assigned non-trivial predicates.
(ii) Definition 7.1 differs from the definition of contextual equivalence in [14] in some respect. First, we consider contexts of any ground type as an "experiment"; moreover, we do not consider reduction rules for constants as "if then else"; as a consequence we cannot discriminate between different constants like true and false. It is for that reason that we use in the above definition and in Theorem 7.7 the predicate a ⇓ v instead of a ⇓.
Let a{x j ← b j } j ≤k abbreviate the simultaneous substitution of b j for x j in a for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and similarly 
(Val Object) : the last inference is an instance of the rule:
; , x j :A: Proof As noted in (i) of Remark 7.2 a typeable value v can be assigned non-trivial predicates, so that a ⇓ v implies that the same predicates can be derived for a because of Theorem 5.6; on the other hand a straightforward induction on the structure of σ shows that if σ is non trivial, then any a A ∈ tσ u converges: by this and Theorem 7.5 we conclude.
Corollary 7.6 has important consequences. First it expresses the computational adequacy of the logical equivalence, in the sense that no divergent term can be equated with a term converging to a value. Combining this with the subject reduction and expansion Theorems 5.3 and 5.6, it says that predicates actually foresee properties of values: since the latter include function and objects, such properties concern behaviour and not just aspects of elementary values such as integers or Booleans.
But it is stronger than the above mentioned theorems, since we know that logical equivalence is not simply convertibility (not even the equational theory of [1] ). In fact Corollary 7.6 entails the subsequent Theorem 7.7, which states the inclusion of the logical equivalence into the observational equivalence, and hence the consistency of the former, and of the whole logic of predicates we are about. Language inclusion alone is not sufficient to account for subtyping of object types, while it is for record types (see [13] This rule formalises the idea that when A <: A and A and A are object types, the methods of any object of type A not mentioned in A are hidden: therefore if a satisfies the premise of any arrow predicate concerning the hidden part, this will never change in contexts of type A , in such a way that the latter premise can be discharged. Clearly, with reference to Example 6. We have not considered this rule in our assignment system, however. The proof of the soundness of such a rule requires a different definition of the realizability interpretation, and makes the proof theory of the assignment system more involved. On the other hand, it is difficult to say to what extent we obtain a stronger equivalence. Indeed the coincidence of logical equivalence with observational equivalence is quite unlikely: the former is indeed the theory of a filter model which is a D ∞ model; we know from [5] that it is not fully abstract with respect to the lazy λ-calculus, which is a sub-calculus of the Object Calculus we consider. Were logical equivalence and observational equivalence the same, a full abstraction property would hold for the model.
Conclusions and Related Work
The system and results presented in this paper have been developed through a series of papers, [12, 13, 21, 22] , of which the present work is an extended and revised version.
To summarise our work, it can be seen as an intersection type assignment system (see e.g. [22] and the references there) to typed terms of the first order object calculus from [1] . A similar idea of assignment of logical formulas to terms of a simply typed λ-calculus with recursive types is the endogenous logic in [4] , where languages are used to provide a finitary description of the domain interpretation of types, and a denotation of terms, much as it happens for filter models of the type free λ-calculus in [7] . With respect to these antecedents our technical contribution consists both in the consideration of object types and, more importantly, in the treatment of subtyping, for which we build on ideas presented in [13] .
Our results substantiate the claim that logical semantics allows for a clean and elegant understanding of subtyping, which is seen as a form of (reverse) inclusion of logical theories, indexed by types. This seems remarkable in presence of arrow, object and recursive types, whose combination is notoriously very difficult to model.
The resulting logical equivalence is consistent with the equivalence axiomatically defined in [1] , and operationally sound with respect to the Morris-style semantics studied in [14] . We remark that logic adds to the abstraction represented by types, in that it is able to capture computational properties like convergence and context separability, which is not the case for types. To show this, we resort to the technical tool of realizability interpretation of predicates, which comes from [12] and is a mild extension of known techniques from the λ-calculus. Its relation to types and subtyping, however, is not completely understood and is clearly involved in the treatment of the rule suggested at the end of Sect. 7.
The present study rests on the assignment system and its proof theoretical properties, without facing the problem of models. In [13] a filter model construction is proposed in which types are interpreted as the CUPERs (studied in [3, 6, 10] and used in [1] Chap. 14) induced by the indiscernibility relation with respect to the predicates of a language. Terms are interpreted as filters of predicates, but their meaning in a type A is obtained by restricting to L A . Such a restriction, trivially idempotent, is also continuous, which suggested the interpretation of the restriction operation in terms of retractions over a D ∞ universal model in [21] . Unfortunately retractions do not allow for a sound treatment of subtyping because of their covariant behaviour with respect to both left and right-hand sides of arrow types. Although we think that a model is implicitly described by our system, the analysis of its structure and the comparison with existing denotational models of subtyping deserve further investigation.
Our system provides a program logic for the first order ς -calculus, which is natural to compare with similar proposals in the literature. In [2] a Hoare-style logic for a first order object calculus with subtyping is presented. A close relationship exists between their transition relations and our predicates i :σ i → φ i (i∈I ) . In fact, even if transition relations are expressed via first order predicate logic whereas our logic is propositional, they specify pre and post conditions of methods in terms of properties of filed values before and after method invocation. We can do the same, since fields are simply methods that do not depend on self variables, so that we can encode their properties by means of predicates of the shape :ω → ψ (and conjunctions of them); we then put them as the premises σ i above, and encode post conditions in the φ i . We stress however that our framework is more powerful, because in [2] only field update is permitted, whereas our logic is sound in the presence of the stronger operation of method overriding.
The latter limitation is removed in [17] , at the price of losing monotonicity of the transition relations. To handle this difficulty, a notion of specification Spec (A, B, T ) is introduced as the unique fixed point of the bi-functor A, B, T induced by the field predicate A, the result predicates B and the transition relations T ; such a fixed point does not exist in general, and it can be assured only under suitable conditions (Existence Theorem). We first remark a tight similarity between the definition of Spec(A, B, T ) and of t :σ → ψ u here, especially for the quantification in the clause ∀c A ∈ tσ u. a. (c) ∈ tψu. Then we observe that the realizability interpretation of predicates is inductive, so that tσ u always exists. Although we do not have a definite answer, it seems reasonable to think that our predicates are particular cases of specifications, enjoying the good properties, which would explain why we do not need an existence theorem at all. The model of the logic proposed in [17] is for the untyped ς -calculus, both functional and imperative, so that there is nothing to remark about subtyping semantics here. A different approach to the relationship between program logic and subtyping is "behavioural subtyping" as exposed e.g. in [18] . It is based on the "subtype requirement" which says that if A <: B and φ(b) for all b:B then φ(a) for all a:A, where φ(x) is a certain predicate of x. This recalls the fact that L A ⊇ L B whenever A <: B in our system. However, because of the universal quantifiers in the subtyping requirement, the predicates of [18] are likely to be properties of types rather than of programs, so that they are better seen as a reinforcement of the abstractions expressed by types, rather than as a description of behaviours. The latter is exactly what we gain in our system, as shown via the Realizability Theorem 7.5.
